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objectives are: to unite efforts in the search for answers to the questions raised
by the managers of finance companies and the finance staff of all types of
companies during their daily work; to develop new tools for financial
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from: Aena, A.T. Kearney, Caja Madrid, Datastream, Grupo Endesa, Fundación
Ramón Areces, Telefónica and Unión Fenosa.EXPLAINING THE DIVERSIFICATION DISCOUNT
Abstract
Diversified firms trade at a discount relative to similar single-segment firms. We argue
in this paper that this observed discount is not per se evidence that diversification destroys
value. Firms choose to diversify. Firm characteristics which make firms diversify might also
cause them to be discounted. Not taking into account these firm characteristics might lead to the
observed discount being wrongly attributed to diversification. Data from the Compustat
Industry Segment File from 1978 to 1996 are used to select a sample of single-segment and
diversifying firms. We use three alternative econometric techniques to control for the
endogeneity of the diversification decision. All three methods suggest the presence of self-
selection in the decision to diversify and a negative correlation between firms’ choice to
diversify and firm value. The diversification discount always drops, and sometimes turns into a
premium, when we control for the endogeneity of the diversification decision. We do a similar
analysis in a sample of refocusing firms. Again, some evidence of self-selection by firms exists
and we now find a positive correlation between firms’ choice to refocus and firm value. These
results consistently suggest the importance of taking the endogeneity of the diversification
status into account when analyzing its effect on firm value.
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Firms choose to diversify. They choose to diversify when the benefits of diversification
outweigh the costs of diversification and stay focused when they do not. The characteristics of
firms that diversify which make the benefits of diversification greater than the costs
of diversification may also cause firms to be discounted. A proper evaluation of the effect of
diversification on firm value should take into account the firm-specific characteristics which bear
both on firm value and on the decision to diversify. 
Research by Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995) and Servaes (1996)
shows unambiguously that diversified firms trade at a discount relative to non-diversified firms
in their industries. Other research confirms the existence of this discount on diversified
firms and this result seems to be robust to different time periods and different countries (1).
There is a growing consensus that the discount on diversified firms implies a destruction of
value on account of diversification, i.e. on account of firms operating in multiple divisions. 
This study shows that the failure to control for firm characteristics which lead firms
to diversify, and to be discounted, may wrongly attribute the discount to diversification
instead of to the underlying characteristics. For example, consider a firm facing technological
change which adversely affects its competitive advantage in its industry. This poorly
performing firm will trade at a discount relative to other firms in the industry. Such a firm
will also have lower opportunity costs of assigning its scarce resources in other industries,
and this might lead it to diversify. If poorly performing firms tend to diversify, then not
taking into account past performance and its effect on the decision to diversify will result in
attributing the discount to diversification activity rather than to the firm’s poor performance. 
Also consider the case of a firm that possesses some unique organizational
capability that it wants to exploit. Incomplete information may force this firm to enter into
costly search through diversification to find industries with a match to its organizational
capital. Matsusaka (1995) proposes a model in which a value maximizing firm forgoes the
benefits of specialization to search for a better match. During the search period the market
value of the firm will be lower than the value of a comparable single-segment firm.
Maksimovic and Philips (1998) also develop a model where the firm optimally chooses the
number of segments in which it operates depending on its comparative advantage. Not taking
into account firm characteristics which make diversification optimal, in this case searching
(1) Servaes (1996) finds a discount for conglomerates during the 1960s, while Matsusaka (1993) documents
gains to diversifying acquisitions in the late 1960s in the United States.  Lins and Servaes (1999) document
a significant discount in Japan and UK, though none exists for Germany.  The evidence from emerging
economies is mixed. While Khanna and Palepu (1999), Fauver, Houston and Naranjo (1998) find little
evidence of a diversification discount in emerging markets, Lins and Servaes (1998) report a diversification
discount in a sample of firms from seven emerging markets.for a match, may again attribute the discount wrongly to value destruction arising from
diversification. 
This does not imply that there are no agency costs associated with firms operating in
multiple divisions. Consider the impact of cross sectional variation in private benefits of
managers. A firm with a manager who has high private benefits will undertake activities
which are at conflict with shareholder value maximization. Such a firm will be discounted
relative to other firms in its industry. Such a manager is also more likely to undertake value-
destroying diversification. However, even in this case the observed discount on multi-
segment years is partially accounted for by the ex ante discount at which the firm is trading,
on account of high private benefits, before diversification. Not taking into account firm
characteristics, in this case high agency costs, leads to an overestimation of the value
destruction attributed to diversification.
In this paper, we attempt to control for this endogeneity of a firm’s decision to
diversify when evaluating the effect of diversification on firm value. The arguments suggest
that the decision to diversify depends on the presence of firm-specific characteristics that lead
some firms to generate more value from diversification than others. Choice of organization
structure should therefore be treated as an endogenous outcome that maximizes firm value,
given a set of exogenous determinants of diversification, i.e. the set of firm characteristics.
Evaluating the impact of diversification on firm value therefore requires taking into account
the endogeneity of the diversification decision. 
Controlling for the endogeneity of the diversification decision requires identifying
variables that affect the decision to diversify while being uncorrelated with firm value. This
becomes difficult as most variables that bear on the diversification decision also impact firm
value. We build on the methodology of Berger and Ofek (1995) and the insights of Lang and
Stulz (1994) to control for the endogeneity of the diversification decision. Like Berger and Ofek
(1995), we value firms relative to the median single-segment firm in the industry. This measure
has the advantage of being neutral to industry and time shocks that affect all firms in a similar
way. However, Lang and Stulz (1994) show that industry characteristics are important in a
firm’s decision to diversify (2). We explore the data for systematic industry differences among
single-segment and diversifying firms that might help explain the decision to diversify.
We first reproduce the results existing in the literature and identify a diversification
discount in our sample. Preliminary data analysis shows that conglomerates differ from single-
segment firms in their underlying characteristics. We control for the endogeneity of the
diversification decision in three ways. Firstly, we control for unobservable firm characteristics
that affect the diversification decision by introducing fixed firm effects. Secondly, we model
the firm’s decision to diversify as a function of industry, firm and macroeconomic
characteristics. We use the probability of diversifying as an instrument for the diversification
status in evaluating the effect of multiple-segment operations on firm value. Lastly, we model
an endogenous self-selection model and use Heckman’s correction to control for the self-
selection bias induced on account of a firm’s choosing to diversify. 
The diversification discount always drops, and sometimes turns into a premium,
when we control for the endogeneity of the diversification decision. The evidence in all three
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(2) Lang and Stulz (1994) find that firms that diversify tend to be in slow-growing industries. They also report
that diversified firms have lower Tobin’s q than focused firms, but this difference was driven by differences
among firms across industries rather than within an industry.methods indicates that the discount on multiple-segment firm-years is partly due to
endogeneity. The coefficient of the correction for self-selection is negative, indicating that
there is a negative correlation between a firm’s choice to diversify and firm value. This
supports the view that firm characteristics, which cause firms to diversify, also cause them to
be discounted. 
Finally, we do a similar analysis in a sample of refocusing firms. Comment and Jarrell
(1995), John and Ofek (1995) and Berger and Ofek (1996) document an increase in firm value
associated with the decision to refocus. Much like the decision to diversify, the decision to
refocus is also endogenous: Firms choose to refocus when the presence of firm-specific
characteristics makes the benefits of refocusing greater than the costs of refocusing (3).
Consider the case when changes in industry conditions generate higher-than-expected growth
opportunities in one segment. This might increase the cost of an inefficient internal capital
market, increasing the cost of operating in multiple divisions and making refocusing optimal. In
this case, firm characteristics which make the refocusing decision optimal, i.e. growth
opportunities, also cause the firm to be more highly valued. Unlike the diversification decision,
the refocusing decision is positively correlated with firm value. Not taking firm characteristics
(in this case growth opportunities) into account prior to refocusing may erroneously attribute
the associated premium to multi-segment operations of firms. This would lead to an
underestimation of the discount associated with multi-segment operations prior to refocusing.
Controlling for firm characteristics which make the refocusing decision optimal may further
increase the discount associated with multi-segment operations of these firms. We document
evidence in support of this view.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss
related literature. Section III describes the data, sample selection criteria and preliminary
analysis. Section IV discusses the estimation methodology. Section V presents the evidence for
diversifying firms and Section VI does the same for refocusing firms. Section VII concludes.
Related literature
There is a vast and well-developed literature on the benefits and costs of diversification.
The gains from diversification could arise from many sources. Gains to diversification arise from
managerial economies of scale as proposed by Chandler (1977) and from increased debt capacity
as argued by Lewellen (1971). Diversified firms also gain from more efficient resource
allocation through internal capital markets. Weston (1970) argues that the larger internal capital
markets in diversified firms help them allocate resources more efficiently. Stulz (1990) shows
that larger internal capital markets help diversified firms reduce the underinvestment problem
described by Myers (1977). Stein (1997) argues that the winner-picking ability of headquarters
may allow internal capital markets in diversified firms to work more efficiently than external
capital markets. Gains to diversification also arise from the ability of diversified firms to
internalize market failures. Khanna and Palepu (1999) document gains to business group
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(3) In a static model, the above arguments would suggest that when the net benefit to operating in multiple
segments is negative, the firm should immediately refocus.  In practice, the decision to diversify and refocus
involves large amounts of sunk and irreversible costs that lead to a lot of persistence in diversification
status. There is as yet no clear understanding of the dynamic theory of firms’ diversification status, but one
can draw an analog from recent theory on irreversible investment decisions (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
This literature has emphasized that temporary shocks can have permanent effects due to hysteresis, which is
consistent with an observed discount of multiple-segment firms.affiliation in India and emphasize the role of diversified groups in replicating the functions of
institutions that are missing in emerging markets. Hadlock, Ryngaert and Thomas (1998) argue
that diversified firms gain from a reduction of the adverse selection problem at the time of equity
issues. Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988), Matsusaka and Nanda (1994) and Bodnar, Tang and
Weintrop (1998) propose gains to diversification based on the presence of firm specific assets
which can be exploited in other markets. Schoar (1999) finds that diversified firms are more
productive than firms within their industry on average, though they still appear to be discounted.
There are costs to diversification as well. The costs can arise from inefficient
allocation of capital among divisions of a diversified firm. Stulz (1990) and Scharfstein
(1998) show that diversified firms invest more than single-segment firms in poor lines of
business or in businesses with low Tobin’s q. Lamont (1997) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales
(1997) also report evidence on inefficient allocation of capital within conglomerates. Meyer,
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) make a related argument of cross subsidization of failing
business segments. The difficulty of designing optimal incentive compensation for managers
of diversified firms also generates costs of multi-segment operations. Aron (1988, 1989),
Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) and Hermalin and Katz (1994) show the greater difficulty of
motivating managers in diversified firms in comparison to focused firms. Information
asymmetries between central management and divisional managers will also lead to higher
costs of operating in multiple segments, as has been shown by Myerson (1982) and Harris,
Kriebel and Raviv (1982). Lastly, costs of operating in multiple segments could arise on
account of increased incentive for rent seeking by managers within the firm (see Scharfstein
and Stein (1997)) and opportunities for managers of firms with free cash flow to engage in
value destroying investments (see Jensen (1986), (1988)). Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997)
provide empirical evidence that agency costs are related to the diversification decision. They
find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial ownership. Hyland
(1999) examines firm characteristics including agency costs, and finds no support that agency
costs explain the decision of firms to diversify. 
Our focus in this paper is not on identifying any of the above-mentioned individual
benefits and costs of diversification, but rather to concentrate on the net gain to
diversification. Firms are likely to diversify when there are net gains to diversification and
stay focused when there are net costs to diversifying. Most importantly for us, the above
research shows that the benefits and costs of diversification are related to firm-specific
characteristics. We control for firm characteristics which cause firms to diversify, i.e. which
generate a net gain to multi-segment operations, and isolate the net impact of the
diversification decision. 
Our paper is not the first to take into account the endogeneity of the diversification
decision. A growing theoretical literature has been modeling the decision to diversify as a value
increasing strategy for the firm. Matsusaka (1995) develops a model in which the firm chooses
to diversify when the gains from searching for a better organizational fit outweigh the costs of
reduced specialization. Fluck and Lynch (1999) propose that diversification allows marginally
profitable projects which could not get financed as stand-alone entities to get financed. Perold
(1999) models the diversification decision in financial intermediaries and shows that
diversification reduces firms’ deadweight costs of capital and so permits divisions to operate on
a larger scale than stand-alone firms. Maksimovic and Philips (1998) also develop a model
where the firm optimally chooses the number of segments in which to operate depending on its
comparative advantage. They further show empirically that conglomerates allocate resources
optimally, based on the relative efficiency of divisions.
4There has been other recent empirical work that provides evidence in support of the
importance of selection bias and the endogeneity of the diversification decision. Chevalier
(2000) finds that even prior to merging, diversifying firms display investment patterns that
could be identified as cross subsidization. Whited (1999) finds that after controlling for the
measurement problems in Tobins Q, there is no evidence of inefficient allocation of resources
in diversified firms. Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (1999) propose that diversified firms are
discounted because they acquire discounted firms. 
Data
Sample Selection 
The sample consists of all firms with data reported on the Compustat Industry
Segment database from 1978 to 1996. We follow the Berger and Ofek (1995) [from here on
BO(95)] sample selection criteria and exclude from the sample years where firms report
segments in the financial sector (SIC 6000-6999), years with sales less than $20 million,
years with a missing value of total capital and years in which the sum of segment sales
deviated from total sales by more than 1% (4). Additionally, we excluded years where the
firm did not report four-digit SICs for all its segments. The final sample consists of 8,815
firms with a total of 58,965 firm years. 
Measure of Excess Value 
To examine whether diversification increases or decreases value, we use the excess
value measure developed by BO (95), which compares a firm’s value to its imputed value if
each of its segments operated as a single-segment firm. Each segment of a multiple-segment
firm is valued using median industry sales and asset multipliers of single-segment firms. The
imputed value of the firm is the sum of the segment values. Excess value is defined as the log of
the ratio of firm value to imputed value. Negative excess value implies that the firm trades at a
discount while positive excess values are indicative of a premium (5).
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(4) Years with segments in the financial services were excluded on account of the difficulty in valuing financial
firms using multipliers.  Years with sales less than 20 million dollars were excluded to prevent distortions
caused by including very small firms.
(5) The imputed value of a segment is obtained by multiplying segment sales (asset) with the median sales
(asset) multiplier of all single-segment firm years in that SIC.  The sales (asset) multipliers are the median
value of the ratio of total capital to sales (assets).  Total capital is the sum of market value of equity, long
and short-term debt and preferred stock.  The industry definitions are based on the narrowest SIC grouping
that includes at least 5 firms. Extreme excess values, where the natural log of the ratio of actual to imputed
value is greater than 1.386 or less than –1.386, were excluded. The imputed value using sales multipliers of
about 50% of all firms was based on matches at the four-digit SIC code, 26.5% were based on matches at
the three-digit SIC code and 23.5% were based on matches at the two-digit or lower SIC code. The results
using asset multipliers are similar. This is in line with the results reported in BO (95) of 44.6% matches at
the four-digit level, 25.4% matches at the three-digit level and 30% matches at the two-digit level or lower.
See BO (95) for further details on methodology.Documenting the Discount
In this section, we document the existence of a discount in line with prior work. We
find that the median discount on multi-segment years is 10.9% (11.6%) using sales (asset)
multipliers for the entire sample from 1978 to 1996, similar to the discount of 10.6% (16.2%)
reported by BO (95) for the years 1986 to 1991 (6). We begin by estimating a model of
excess value as specified by BO (95) so as to guarantee that any differences in the final
results are not driven by differences in sample or methodology. They model excess value as a
function of firm size, proxied by log of total assets, profitability (EBIT/SALES), investment
(CAPX/SALES) and diversification, proxied by D, a dummy which takes the value 1 for
years when the firm operates in multiple segments and zero otherwise. As seen in Table I, the
coefficient of D is –0.13 (–0.12) and significant at the 1% (1%) level when sales (assets)
multipliers are used. When we restrict the sample to the years 1986-1991, the coefficient of D
is –0.12 (–0.13) using sales (asset) multipliers, which is very close to the value of –0.144
(–0.127) reported by BO (95). The estimated discount in our sample is similar to that
documented by BO (95). 
We test the robustness of the estimated discount to model specification by including
lagged values of firm size, profitability and investment. Past profitability and investment may
control for firm characteristics which affect firm value. We also include log of total assets
squared to control for the possibility of a non-linear effect of firm size on firm value. The
coefficient of the square of firm size is negative, suggesting that the positive effect of firm
size on excess value diminishes as firm size increases. We also include the ratio of long-term
debt to total assets. The results, reported in columns 3 and 6 of Table 1, show that the
estimated discount is about 11% with both sales and asset multipliers. There is weak evidence
that firms with high past profitability (high EBIT/SALES) and high past investments (high
CAPX/SALES) are valued higher than the median single-segment firm in the industry,
though the coefficients are not significant. Summarizing, multiple-segment firms show a
significant discount and this discount is robust to the inclusion of additional variables in the
valuation equation. We report all results with this extended model. As a comparison, the
results with the basic BO (95) model are similar and are discussed in Sections 5.5 and 6.5.
Are multi-segment firms different? 
In this section, we examine the characteristics of conglomerates which might cause
them to diversify. We also examine if conglomerates differ from single-segment firms in their
underlying characteristics.
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(6) For the years 1986 to 1991, we find that the median multiple-segment discount in our sample is 7.6%
(10.3%) using sales (asset) multipliers. This difference with the BO (95) results is possibly due to a
difference in sample size. The number of firm years, in the period 1986 to 1991, in our sample is 17875,
greater than the 16181 reported by BO (95).  There are 4565 firms in our sample as opposed to 3659 firms
reported by BO (95).  Our sample size is larger by 1142 (977) observations when using sales (asset)
multiplier regressions. This increase in the sample size could arise on two accounts. Firstly, if firms restate
their results such that they are no longer excluded due to one or more sample selection criteria, they might
be included in our sample while not being included in the BO (95) sample.  Secondly, Compustat might add
firms to the database along with the data for prior years.  The largest category in this group (according to
Compustat sources) consists of small firms which trade on OTC markets and are added when they change
listing or on client request. Our overall sample, from 1978 to 1996, of 8815 firms and 58965 observations is
similar to the sample of 8467 firms and 58332 observations reported by Graham, Lemmon and Wolf
(1999).The 8,815 firms in our sample differ in their diversification profiles. The largest
group consists of 5,387 single-segment firms, which accounted for 30,284 firm years, as
shown in Table II. The rest are firms which report operating in multiple segments at some
point in the time period under consideration. These firms will be referred to as multiple-
segment firms or conglomerates in the paper. Among these multiple-segment firms, there
were broadly four kinds: Firms which diversify, those that refocus, those that do both and
lastly conglomerate firms which do not change the number of segments in which they
operate. The largest group consists of 1,371 firms (13,133 firm years) which report both
increasing and decreasing the number of segments in this time period. The next largest group
consists of 873 firms (7,987 firm years) who refocused. There are 606 firms (4,326 firm
years) which report diversifying in this period (7). 
Next we examine the characteristics of single-segment and multiple-segment firm
years. Table III reports average value of firm size, investment, profitability, leverage, research
and development and industry growth rates for the different diversification profiles. Industry
growth rate is the increase in industry sales, defined at the two-digit SIC level. SIC
classification was obtained from the business segment data. Divisional sales for conglomerates
were included in the respective SICs for the calculation of total industry sales (8). 
Single-segment years of conglomerates are significantly different from single-segment
firms in their characteristics. Single-segment years of conglomerates are bigger, have higher
leverage and lower R&D than single-segment firms. This is consistent with Hyland (1999), who
finds that diversifying firms have lower research and development expenses. With regard to
CAPX/SALES and EBIT/SALES, not only do single-segment years of conglomerates differ
from single-segment firms, but they also differ significantly among them. Single-segment years
of diversified firms have higher CAPX/SALES and higher EBIT/SALES, while single-segment
years of refocusing firms and firms which both refocus and diversify have lower CAPX/SALES
and lower EBIT/SALES than single-segment firms. In summary, firm characteristics differ
across single-segment years in different diversification profiles.
There are also significant differences in the characteristics of multi-segment years of
conglomerates. Multiple segment years of diversifying firms tend to invest more in research
and development (RND/SALES) than others. They also have higher capital investment
(CAPX/SALES) and higher profitability (EBIT/SALES) than multiple-segment years of
refocusing firms and firms which both refocus and diversify. Conglomerates that do not
change diversification status seem to be in mature industries with lower growth and have low
research and development costs while enjoying a higher profitability (EBIT/SALES) and
higher capital investment (CAPX/SALES). Multiple segment years of refocusing firms tend
to have the lowest profitability and capital investment. This suggests that differences in
characteristics of multiple-segment years might be related to the choice of diversification
strategy.
Next we examine the characteristics of the discount over time and across the
different diversification profiles. Table IVa documents the average annual discount from 1978
to 1996 estimated using sales and asset multipliers. There is substantial variation, with the
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(7) Firms were classified using all available data, i.e. the years excluded on account of sample selection criteria
were also taken into account for the purpose of categorizing firms. This ensures that restructuring activity in
years that were excluded from the sample is also taken into account.
(8) Total industry sales is a function of firms entering and leaving Compustat, of restructuring activities of
firms and of accounting changes which cause firms to report sales in different SICs over the years. These
growth rates therefore have been estimated with noise and have high volatility.median discount using sales multipliers being as low as –0.058 in 1982 and zero for years
1987 to 1991. The excess value measures firm value relative to the median single-segment
firm in the industry for that year. This makes the excess value measure industry- and time-
neutral. What generates these time patterns in the excess value measure? 
Time patterns in the excess value measure could arise on account of two factors.
Firstly, the distribution of single-segment firms around the median could change. As can be
seen from Columns 2 and 3 of Table IVb, though the median excess value of all single-segment
firm years used to estimate median industry multipliers is zero by construction, the mean varies
from –0.02 in 1992 to +0.01 in 1989. Secondly, time effects could also arise on account of entry
and exit of firms in the sample. Table IVb, columns 4-7, documents the average annual excess
values (using sales multipliers) for the last and first year of firms in the data. There are two
interesting facts which emerge from Table IVb. First, firms have negative excess value in the
last year in the data. This effect is not limited to just the last year in the dataset but these firms
are not average discounted. Let us refer to these firms that exit the sample, i.e. are included in
the Compustat research tapes, as exiting firms. In contrast, new firms in the data set have
positive excess values in their first year. These new firms entering the data are valued
systematically higher relative to the median single-segment firm in the industry. Secondly, there
is variation over time in the number of firms exiting and entering the data. Exit (entry) of firms
with low (high) excess values reduces (raises) the median industry multiplier in that year,
consequently increasing (decreasing) the relative valuation of existing firms in the industry.
Though the median excess values of single-segment years have been normalized to zero, the
median excess values of conglomerates will have a time pattern related to the changes in
industry composition rather than to changes in its intrinsic value. 
This would not be of much concern in the estimation of the impact of diversification
status on firm value if firms entered and exited the sample randomly. This is because the
values of all firms, single and conglomerate, change proportionately over time, leaving the
relative valuation of multiple-segment firm years unchanged. However, if changes in industry
composition are not random but related to the decision of firms to diversify or refocus, then
changes in industry composition become a source of concern. Consider, for instance, a firm
which diversifies when poorly performing firms in the industry exit on account of few growth
opportunities in the industry. Exit of poor performers raises the median industry multiplier
and increases the imputed value of the diversifying firm when it diversifies. This will cause
the firm to trade at a discount after diversification. This discount is due to change in industry
composition (exit of poor performers), which is correlated with the decision to diversify,
rather than due to any change in the firm’s intrinsic value.
To examine whether changes in industry composition differ by diversification
decision, we study the distribution and percentage sales accounted for by exiting firms. For
each firm, we calculate the share of sales accounted for by exiting firms in their industry (at
the two digit SIC level) for that year. For conglomerates, we weight each segment’s exposure
to exiting firms by its sales. We also calculate the fraction of all firms in an industry that exit.
Table IVc documents the average exposure to exiting firms for the different diversification
profiles, and highlights some interesting patterns. Single-segment years of diversifying firms
operate in industries with the highest incidence of exit. In these industries, 28% of all firms
exit in a given year and the exiting firms account for 15% of industry sales. Single-segment
firms in contrast belong to industries where exiting firms account for only 14% of all firms
and 6% of industry sales. While single-segment years of diversifying firms have the highest
exposure to exiting firms, multiple-segment years of diversifying firms have one of the
lowest exposures to exiting firms. In contrast, single-segment years of refocusing firms
operate in industries with the lowest fraction of exiting firms while multiple-segment years of
8refocusing firms tend to be in industries with the highest incidence of exiting firms. We
observe that firms are moving towards industries where the exit rate is significantly lower,
which suggests that firms both diversify and refocus, from industries experiencing difficulties
(higher exit) into industries with better prospects (lower exit). This also supports the finding
in Lang and Stulz (1995) that diversifying firms tend to be in bad industries characterized by
higher exit. This is consistent with our view that firms endogenously choose to diversify and
refocus and indicates that changes in industry composition are related to the firms’
diversification strategy.
Firms also show systematic patterns in their discounts prior to whether they decide
to diversify or exit the industry. Single-segment years of diversifying firms do not trade at a
discount. This indicates that these firms do not do badly compared to the median firm in the
industry prior to diversifying. However, as seen from Table IVc these firms are in industries
with high incidence of exit. Combining these two results suggests that single-segment years
of diversifying firms might be better than the firms which exit the industry but worse than the
firms which continue as single-segment firms in the industry. This intuition is confirmed by
the statistics reported in Table IVd. Single-segment years of diversifying firms which do not
exit, have a median discount of zero. This is better than the 4% discount for single-segment
firms in the same four-digit SIC which exit and worse than the 2% premium for single-
segment firms in the same four-digit SIC which do not exit.
Summarizing, there are significant differences in firm characteristics between single-
segment firms and single-segment years of conglomerates. There are also significant
differences in firm characteristics between multiple-segment years of conglomerates with
different diversification profiles. There are also differences in industry compositions over time.
Firms which diversify (focus) come from industries with high exit rates. These firms have
values prior to diversification that are significantly higher than those of firms that exit the
industry but lower than those of the firms that remain as single-segment firms. These changes
in industry composition seem to be correlated with the decision to diversify and refocus. We
will try to control for both firm specific as well as these industry specific changes which might
cause the decision to diversify/refocus to be correlated with the estimated discount. The next
section discusses the methodology to control for this endogeneity.
Estimation methodology
We examine the effect of diversification on firm value by modeling firm value as a
function of firm characteristics. We define our measure of relative firm value, Vit, as:
(1)
where Xit is a set of exogenous observable characteristics of the firm, Dit is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in more than one segment and 0
otherwise, δ  = {δ 0, δ 1, δ 2} is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and eit is an error term. 
Our hypothesis is that firms that choose to diversify are not a random sample of
firms. If the decision of these firms to diversify is correlated with the relative value of the firm,
Dit will be correlated with the error term in equation (1). The OLS estimate of δ 2 will therefore
be biased. Specifically, we assume that a firm’s decision to diversify is determined by 
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where Dit
* is an unobserved latent variable, Zit is a set of firm characteristics that affect the
decision to diversify, and µ it is an error term. The correlation between Dit and eit in equation (1)
will arise when: (a) some of the exogenous variables in the diversification equation, Zit, affect
the firm’s relative value but are not included as regressors in the value equation; or (b) the error
terms eit and µ it are correlated. In either case the estimation of δ 2 using ordinary least squares
will be biased. 
We use three different techniques to control for the correlation between Dit and eit in
equation (1) and come up with an unbiased estimator of δ 2. First, we take advantage of the
availability of a panel data-set and use a fixed-effect estimator in equation (1), assuming that
all the unobserved heterogeneity that leads to the correlation between the error terms is
constant over time. 
Secondly, we attempt to jointly estimate equations (1) and (2) in a simultaneous
equation framework. The estimation of this system of simultaneous equations is not easy
because the natural instruments for Dit, the observed firm characteristics, are already included
in the firm value equation (equation (1)), causing the system to be unidentified (9). As Vit is
the firm’s value relative to the median firm in the industry in any given year, it is, by
construction, independent of any observable characteristics which affect the value of all firms
in a given industry and year in the same manner (10). Lang and Stulz (1994) show that
industry characteristics influence the decision to diversify. Maksimovic and Philips (1999)
highlight the importance of time characteristics and document that assets are reallocated
across firms during economic expansions. We too have documented systematic patterns at the
industry level that result in a correlation among a firm’s relative value and its decision to
diversify (11). 
To capture the overall attractiveness of a given industry to conglomerates, we use
the fraction of all firms in the industry which are conglomerates (PNDIV). The higher the
fraction of multi-segment firms (PNDIV), the more attractive the industry factors are to
diversification (12). We also include, for each firm, the fraction of sales by other firms in the
industry accounted for by diversified firms (PSDIV). As these two variables are highly
correlated, we evaluate them jointly to determine the effect of industry factors on the
diversification decision. We instrument time effects on the diversification decision in various
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(9) Strictly speaking, identification could be obtained only from the non-linearity of Dit in equation (2), but
relying exclusively on the functional form will lead to very weak identification.
(10) Notice that the estimation of equation (1), where Vit is defined as firm value relative to the median firm in
an industry, is almost analogous to the estimation of an industry fixed-effect estimator.
(11) As stated in the introduction, Lang and Stulz (1994) report that diversified firms have on average lower
Tobin’s q than single-segment firms, and that the q for diversifying firms was not significantly lower than
the q for the median firm in their industry. This observation led them to the conclusion that industry
characteristics influence the decision to diversify.  These industry characteristics could, therefore, serve as
instruments for diversification. Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) also find significant industry effects. 
(12) The industry specific factors which influence the decision to diversify may range from changes in industry
regulation, introduction of new technology, market structure and business risk. We use two-digit SIC codes
for industry classification. Firms were classified into industries based on their segment SIC. For
conglomerates we use a sales weighted average of all its segments. include the number of merger/acquisition announcements in a given year (MNUM). The
more active the market for mergers/acquisitions, the higher the probability that a firm will
diversify. We also include the annual value of announced merger/acquisitions, in billions of
US $ (MVOL). Secondly, we capture time trends in the macroeconomic conditions and
business cycles. We include real growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP) and its lagged
value (GDP1). We also include the number of months in the calendar year that the economy
was in a recession (CONTRAC) and its lagged value (CONTRAC1) (13). 
We also include exchange listing of the firm to predict the decision to diversify. We
create a dummy (MAJOREX) which takes the value 1 when the firm is listed on NYSE,
NASDAQ, or AMEX and zero otherwise. Firms are more likely to diversify or refocus if
they are listed on the major exchanges. Listing on major exchanges facilitates firms’
acquisition and divestiture by generating greater visibility and reducing information
asymmetries (making it easier to raise external financing) through greater analyst coverage.
However, firms listed on major exchanges are also likely to have greater liquidity. As firms
with higher liquidity might be valued higher this might also affect relative firm value. We
create a dummy variable (SNP) which takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to the S&P
industrial index or the S&P transportation index, and zero otherwise. This dummy variable
(SNP) controls for liquidity as firms belonging to the S&P index have higher liquidity. As
liquidity impacts both relative firm value and the decision to diversify, we include this SNP
variable in both equations 1 and 2. 
Finally, we also use whether or not the firm is a foreign firm as an instrument. We
create a dummy (FOREIGN) which takes the value 1 when the firm is incorporated abroad
and zero otherwise. Foreign firms might list in the US prior to major financing or as part of
acquisition/corporate restructuring strategy. Foreign firms are therefore more likely to engage
in both diversification and refocusing activities. Though being foreign may predict the
probability of diversifying and refocusing, it does not affect relative firm value. We also
control for average firm characteristics by including the historical average value of log of
total assets, EBIT/Sales and CAPX /Sales.
The third method to control for endogeneity is to control for the self-selection of firms
that diversify using Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure. We estimate expected firm value
conditional on the firm being diversified as E (Vit / Dit  = 1) = δ 0  + δ 1Xit + δ 2 +E (eit /D it = 1).
Assuming that the errors in equations (1) and (2), eit and µ it, have a bivariate normal
distribution with mean zero, standard deviation σ e and 1 and with correlation ρ , we have 
are respectively the 
density and cumulative distribution functions of the standard normal. Similarly, we estimate
the expected firm value conditional on the firm being focused as
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(13) We thank Scott Mayfield for the suggestion of using merger waves, and the editor, Rene Stulz, for the
suggestion of using business cycles to instrument for time trends. The data on merger volume and number
is from Securities Data Corporation and data on GDP growth rates and business cycles is from NBER.
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The difference in the value of single-segment and diversified firms, is given by 
(3)
The right-hand side of the equation (3) is what is estimated by the OLS coefficient of
Dit in equation (1). This estimated discount, using OLS, will therefore be biased downward if ρ,
the correlation of the error terms, is negative, as hypothesized for diversifying firms. This
estimated discount will be biased upward if ρ is positive, as hypothesized for refocusing firms. 
In line with the Heckman two-step procedure, we first estimate equation (2) using a
probit model to get consistent estimates of β denoted by  . These are then used to get
estimates of λ 1 and λ 2 , the correction for self-selection. In the second step, we estimate δ by
estimating 
(4)
where δ λ = ρσ e. The sign of δ λ in the above regression is determined by the sign of
ρ, the correlation between the error terms in equations (1) and (2). We separately examine
diversifying and refocusing firms and control for the endogeneity of the diversification/
refocusing decision (14).
Diversifying firms
We select a sample of all single-segment firms and all diversifying firms.
Diversifying firms included in the sample are those that diversify once from single to
multiple segments, those that diversify once from multiple to multiple segments and those
that diversify multiple times (15). In this sample, we examine whether or not there is any loss
of value associated with operating in multi-segments. We first estimate the model by ordinary
least squares. Columns 2 and 7 in Table V report the results of the estimation of the BO (95)
model in this sample. The estimated multi-segment discount is –0.13 (–0.11) using sales
(asset) multipliers. The estimated discount in this sample of single-segment firms and
diversifying firms is similar to the discount reported for the entire sample in Table I. Columns
3 and 8 report the OLS results for the extended model. The discount using sales (asset)
multiples is 0-0.11 (–0.09) and is significant at the 1% (1%) level.
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(14) Given our lack of understanding of the full dynamics of diversification and refocusing by firms, we
condition the sample based on whether firms choose to diversify or to refocus rather than pool all
observations in one sample.
(15) To ensure that the sample of firms stays the same across all methods, firms with only one year of data have
been removed. These firms would not have been included in the fixed-effects estimation. Further, outliers
have also been excluded.
ˆ βFixed-effect estimation
As discussed in the previous section, we introduce fixed firm effects to control for
unobservable firm characteristics and year effects to control for time effects which affect the
diversification decision. The results of this estimation are reported in Columns 4 and 9 of
Table V. The introduction of two-way fixed effects reduces the estimated discount to 6%
(4%) significant at the 1% (5%) level with sales (asset) multipliers. 
The introduction of firm fixed effects reduces the inter-firm variability in the data
and might increase the noise-to-signal ratio in the estimation. However, the signs and
significance of the coefficients on all other variables in the estimation, with the exception of
leverage and square of assets, remain practically identical to the OLS estimation. The only
coefficient that significantly changes in the regression is the coefficient on D. This result
supports the view that diversification appears to be correlated with unobserved firm
characteristics.
Estimating the probability to diversify: Probit Estimation 
In this section, we discuss the estimation of the probability of diversifying. The
results of this estimation will be used both in the two-stage least squares estimation and in the
Heckman self-selection model. 
Firm specific characteristics influence a firm’s decision to diversify. Firms with low
profitability in their current operations may diversify into other segments in search of more
lucrative opportunities. To control for current and past profitability, we include EBIT/SALES
and its lagged values. Firms with a high level of investment in current operations are less
likely to diversify. We therefore include CAPX/SALES and its lagged values. R&D/SALES
can also be used to control for firm level growth opportunities and section 5.5 reports the
results including this variable in the model. We also control for firm size by including log of
total assets and its lagged values. We also include historical average values of log of total
assets, EBIT/Sales and CAPX /Sales to control further for firm characteristics.
As discussed in Section 4, we identify four instruments which predict the decision to
diversify while leaving firm value unaffected. The first instrument is the attractiveness of the
industry to conglomerates and is proxied by PNDIV (the fraction of all firms in the industry
which are conglomerates) and PSDIV (fraction of sales by other firms in the industry
accounted for by conglomerates). The second instrument captures time trends which might
influence the decision to diversify. These are the number of merger/acquisition
announcements in a given year (MNUM) and their annual value in billions of US $ (MVOL).
We also include real growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP), its lagged value (GDP1),
the number of contractionary months in the year (CONTRAC) and its lagged value
(CONTRAC1). The third instrument is the exchange listing of the firm. Firms listed on major
exchanges (MAJOREX) are more likely to engage in acquisition/divestiture programs. We
control for the effect of liquidity by including SNP (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is
on the S&P industrial index and zero otherwise). The fourth instrument is FOREIGN, which
indicates whether the firm is foreign or not. Foreign firms are more likely to engage in
diversification. 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the probit coefficients are reported in Table
VI. As probit coefficients are difficult to interpret, the table also reports the marginal effects
of the change in each explanatory variable calculated at its sample mean. Small firms (low
13average historical size) with an increase in assets in recent years are more likely to diversify.
There is weak evidence that firms with low profitability (EBIT/SALES) and low investment
(CAPX/Sales) in recent past years but with high average historical profitability and
investment are more likely to diversify. The coefficients are not significant however. Firm
level characteristics are not highly significant in explaining the diversification decision.
Industry and time instruments significantly explain the probability of diversifying.
The coefficient of PNDIV is positive and significant. The coefficient of PSDIV is positive
though not significant at conventional levels. An increase in the fraction of conglomerates in
the industry, by 4% from its mean of 48.6%, increases the probability of operating in multiple
segments by 1%. An increase in merger/acquisition activity leads to an increase in the
probability of operating in multiple segments, i.e. increases the probability of diversifying.
An increase in the number of deals announced (MNUM) by 0.7 thousands, from its mean of
2.03 thousand, leads to an increase of 1% in the probability of multi-segment operations.
Macroeconomic conditions, however, do not significantly influence the probability of
diversifying, with the coefficients of both GDP (GDP1) and CONTRAC (CONTRAC1)
being insignificant. Firms listed on major exchanges are significantly more likely to diversify.
The coefficient of MAJOREX is positive and significant as hypothesized. The coefficient of
SNP is negative and significant. Firms in the S&P industrial or transportation index are less
likely to diversify. Foreign firms are also more likely to diversify, though this effect is not
significant.
2SLS estimation
We use the estimated probability of operating in multiple segments from the probit
models reported in Table VI as a generated instrument for the diversification status. In the
first stage, we use all the exogenous variables along with the probability of diversifying as
explanatory variables in the decision to diversify, i.e. D (16). In the second stage we use the
fitted value from the first stage as an instrument for D. The results are reported in Columns 5
and 10 of Table V. We find that the coefficient of the instrumented D is 0.30 (0.19) with sales
(asset) multipliers and is significant at the 1% (1%) level. 
To test for the existence of endogeneity, we use Hausman’s test. The Hausman test is
based on the difference between the OLS estimator (which is consistent and efficient under
the null hypothesis of no endogeneity and inconsistent under the alternative) and the IV
estimator (which is consistent under both but inefficient under the null). We can reject the
null of no endogeneity at the 1% level for both sales and asset mutlipliers. Bound, Jaeger and
Baker (1995) show that when instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous
explanatory variable, then even a small correlation between the instruments and the error can
seriously bias estimates and lead to a large inconsistency in the IV estimates. They suggest
reporting partial R2 and F statistics on the instruments in the first stage regression as useful
guides. We find that the probability of diversifying is highly significant, with a t statistic
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(16) This involves regressing D on the estimated probability of diversification as well as on all the exogenous
variables in the excess value equation. We also estimated an alternative model, in which we included all
independent variables including the instruments in the probit equation in lieu of the predicted probability of
diversifying. This alternative model does not impose the non-linear functional form of the probit. We found
that the alternate specification was always dominated by the probit specification and therefore report the
probit results. of 22 (referred to as T stats: first stage), and a partial R2 of 0.02 (17). This alleviates the
concern that our estimation suffers from biases introduced on account of having weak
instruments.
Self-Selection Model
Lastly, we report the results of a two-stage estimation of the endogenous self-selection
model. The estimated parameters of the OLS estimation of equation (4) are reported in
Columns 6 and 11 of Table V. The estimated coefficient of D is 0.18 when using sales
multipliers and is significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient is 0.01 when using asset
multipliers and is not significant. The coefficient of λ , the self-selection parameter, is –0.14
(–0.04) and is significant at the 1% (10%) level when using sales (asset) multipliers. The
estimated coefficient of λ is negative as expected and significant. This indicates the prevalence
of self-selection and suggests that characteristics which make firms choose to diversify are
negatively correlated with firm value. Firms with a higher probability of diversifying also tend
to be discounted. 
In summary, there is significant evidence of endogeneity with both 2SLS and self-
selection models. The multi-segment discount turns positive under both methods and in three
of the four cases it is significant at the 1% level.
Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of our results we ran various specifications of our model. We
briefly report the results of some of these specifications. We include RND/SALES to control
for growth opportunities within the firm. As firms are required to report research and
development expenses only when they exceed 1% of sales, including RND/SALES gives too
many missing observations and generates concerns about sample selection. We consequently
estimate two models. In the first model, we treat all missing observations as having a value of
zero. Results for this are reported in the first panel of Table VII. In the second model, we
exclude all missing values of RND/SALES. The results for this are reported in the second
panel of Table VII. As RND/SALES also affects relative firm value, we include it in both the
probit and the value equation. The results for both models are similar. We find that higher
levels of RND/SALES significantly increase relative firm value. We also found that firms
with higher RND/SALES are significantly less likely to diversify (results not reported),
consistent with results reported in Hyland (1999).
When missing values of RND/SALES are included as zeros, controlling for
RND/SALES does not materially affect the results on the multi-segment discount. There is
significant evidence of endogeneity, with both λ and the Hausman test being significant.
When we use two-way fixed effects the discount drops in comparison to its OLS estimate and
changes to a significant premium with 2SLS and self-selection models. However, when
missing values of RND/SALES are excluded, we find mixed evidence in support of the
endogeneity of the diversification decision. The evidence with sales multipliers is like before.
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(17) The R2 of the first-stage regression without including the generated probability of diversification was 0.035
(0.028) and increases to 0.053 (0.04) when the generated probabilities are included in the regression with
sales (asset) multipliers. The partial R2 is the increase in R2 by including the probability to diversify and is
0.022.However, with asset multipliers, the coefficient of λ is not significant while the estimated
discount of 17% is significant. Excluding missing values of RND/SALES substantially
shrinks the sample. This significant discount with asset multipliers may be due to the sample
selection bias. The estimated discount in the same sample but without including the
RND/SALES variable is a significant 16%, with multiple-segment years accounting for only
4.8% of all observations. This is much lower in comparison to 6.7% of multiple-segment
years in the sample with sales multipliers (with missing RND excluded). It is also much
lower in comparison to the 6.7% (8%) in the full sample with asset (sales) multipliers. This
suggests that sample selection issues might be important in this asset-multiplier sample.
The last two panels of Table VII report the results including industry growth and
without including the lagged values of firm size, profitability and investment. As can be seen,
there continues to be significant evidence of endogeneity. The discount also drops. It is small
when fixed effects are introduced and changes to a premium with 2SLS and self-selection
models.
Overall, there is significant evidence of endogeneity and a negative correlation
between a firm’s decision to diversify and its value. There is little evidence that multi-
segment years of diversifying firms are discounted, and sometimes multi-segment years are
associated with a significant premium. The inclusion/exclusion of variables leaves our initial
results unchanged, indicating strong evidence of the endogeneity of the diversification
decision. The sign, magnitude and significance of the estimated discount/premium remain
intact. This supports the view that for firms that diversify, diversification is not a value-
destroying decision and could possibly be a value-enhancing decision.
Refocusing firms
Evidence on the value destruction associated with multiple segment firms also
comes from observed gains achieved by refocusing firms. Comment and Jarrell (1995), John
and Ofek (1995) and Berger and Ofek (1996) all document gains achieved by refocusing
firms. In this section, we follow the same empirical strategy detailed in the previous section
and examine the firm’s decision to refocus in a sample of single-segment firms and all
refocusing firms. In this sample, the estimated discount in the BO (95) model is 17% (13%)
using sales (asset) multipliers. This discount drops to 13% (11%) with sales (asset)
multipliers in the extended BO (95) model as seen in columns 3 and 8 of Table VIII.
Columns 4 and 9 of Table VIII report the results of the two-way fixed effects. The estimated
discount increases marginally from 13% to 14% with sales multiples. It is unchanged at 11%
when excess values are estimated using asset multipliers.
We find that we can better explain the decision to refocus in comparison to the
decision to diversify. The likelihood ratio index (as seen in Table IX) in the estimation of the
probability to refocus is 0.21, compared with 0.079 for the probability to diversify. Firms
with high historical average investments (average CAPX /Sales) and low recent investments
are less likely to operate in multiple segments, i.e. more likely to refocus. Firms with high
historical average profitability and high recent profitability are less likely to operate in
multiple segments or more likely to refocus. Firms with high historical average value of
assets are more likely to operate in multiple segments. In summary, profitability, investments,
and firm size all significantly explain the decision to refocus, which is in contrast to their
inability to significantly explain the decision to diversify. 
16Besides, firm characteristics, industry characteristics and time trends significantly
determine the probability to refocus. The coefficient of both PNDIV and PSDIV are
significantly positive. An increase in the number of conglomerates, as well as an increase in
the share of sales accounted for by conglomerates, leads to an increase in the probability of
operating in multiple segments, i.e. firms in industries which are attractive to conglomerates
are less likely to refocus. Increase in merger activity, as captured by an increase in the
number of mergers/acquisitions, leads to a decrease in the probability of operating in multiple
segments, i.e. an increase in the probability of refocusing. This is in contrast to the
diversification results, where an increase in merger activity increased the probability of
operating in multiple segments. Favorable merger/acquisition conditions prompt firms both to
diversify and to refocus.
Macroeconomic conditions significantly explain the refocusing decision. This is in
contrast to the diversification decision, where the coefficient of GDP growth and CONTRAC
were not significant. Firms are more likely to operate in multiple segments when in a recession.
There is also evidence that high GDP growth rates increase the probability of operating in
multiple segments. This suggests that extreme macroeconomic conditions reduce the
probability of refocusing. This is only partially consistent with the evidence in Maksimovic and
Philips (1999), who document that asset reallocations are highest in expansions.
Aside from the significance of individual variables, a better fit of the probit model is
also reflected in the significance of the fitted probabilities in the first stage of the two-stage
least squares estimation. The probability of refocusing is highly significant, with a t-statistic
of 52 and a partial R2 of 0.079 (18). The estimated discount increases from 13% to 21% with
sales multipliers. The Hausman test rejects the null of no endogeneity at the 7% level. The
results with asset multipliers are much weaker. There is no evidence of endogeneity and the
estimated discount drops from 8% to 7%, though it is still significant. 
Similar results are obtained when the self-selection model is estimated. The
coefficient of λ , the selectivity correction, is positive as expected and is significant at the 5%
level when using sales multipliers. The estimated discount increases to 21%. However, the
coefficient is not significant when we use asset multipliers, and the estimated discount stays
roughly the same at 10%. In line with the results of the two-stage least squares, there exists
evidence of self-selection only when sales multipliers are used. With sales multipliers there is
evidence that, controlling for the endogeneity of the refocusing decision, there is an increase in
the estimated discount associated with multi-segment operations. Also, the coefficient of the
estimated selectivity bias with sales multipliers is positive as hypothesized, i.e. characteristics
which make firms choose to refocus are positively correlated with excess value. This is in
contrast to the results reported for diversifying firms, where it was estimated with a significant
negative coefficient.
Robustness checks 
We estimate the variants of the basic model to check the robustness of our results,
analogously to what we did in the previous section with the diversification decision. The
estimated results, including the RND/SALES variable, where missing values of RND have
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(18) Though this high significance may merely be a manifestation of a good instrument, it has to be interpreted
carefully. If the instrument is very highly correlated with the endogenous variable, it may also be correlated
with the error, making it an unfit instrument to control for endogeneity. The relatively low R2 in the first-
stage regression suggests this is not a problem in this case. been replaced with zero (Panel A), including only non-missing values of RND/SALES (Panel
B), including industry growth rates (Panel C), and excluding lagged values of the explanatory
variables (Panel D), appear in Table X. Similarly to the analysis for the diversifying sample,
the results do not change significantly. Our estimated discount for multiple-segment years of
refocusing firms is robust to the inclusion of these variables. As reported in Table VIII, there
is strong (weak) evidence of endogeneity using sales (asset) multipliers. 
Conclusion
Firms choose the extent of their operations and decide whether to operate in a single
industry, diversify into multiple industries or refocus their operations. A firm’s choice to
diversify is likely to be a response to exogenous changes in the firm’s environment that also
affect firm value. In this case, the observed correlation between diversification and firm value
is not causal.
There are systematic patterns in diversification strategies and relative value of firms.
Firms are more likely to move away from industries with relatively low growth and high exit
rates. Firms that choose to diversify have higher value than exiting firms in their industry and
lower value than other firms in the industry that remain focused.
We model the effect this endogeneity has on the observed correlation between
diversification and firm value. We use panel data and instrumental variables to control for the
exogenous characteristics that predict the decision to diversify. Once these observed firm
characteristics and firm fixed effects are controlled for, the evidence in favor of the assertion
that diversification destroys value is substantially weaker. When we jointly estimate the
decision of a firm to diversify and firm value, the diversification discount is more likely to be
a premium. The evidence in this paper suggests that diversification is a value-enhancing
strategy for those firms that actually pursue it. 
We follow a similar strategy to evaluate the correlation between firm value and the
decision to refocus. The results are remarkably similar for this case. Firms that refocus their
operations would have suffered a significant decrease in value if they had remained
diversified. This evidence suggests that the observed correlation between diversification
status and firm value need not be causal but rather the outcome of actions by profit-
maximizing firms reacting to shocks in their environments. 
Our results highlight the value of constructing more complete models of the
interaction between firm strategies and firm value. The development of a dynamic model that
will jointly allow for both diversification and focus by firms in response to changes in their
economic environment and that can also be structurally estimated with the available data
seems to us to be the long-run objective. Short of a full dynamic structural model, the evidence
in this paper highlights the importance of identifying large exogenous shocks to firms to
adequately evaluate the relationship between firm choices and equilibrium outcomes.
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21Table I
Estimation of the Diversification Discount
The dependent variable is excess value, defined as the log of the ratio of total market
value to imputed value using median industry multipliers. D is a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 when the firm operates in multi-segments and 0 otherwise, EBIT/SALES is the
ratio of EBIT to sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. LEV is the
ratio of long-term debt to total assets and ASS2 is the square of log of total assets. The first
three columns report the results when sales multipliers are used to estimate imputed firm
values and the last three columns report the results using asset multipliers. The second and
fifth columns report the estimation of the BO (95) specification for the full sample, while
Columns 3 and 6 report the estimation of the BO (95) specification for the years 1986-1991.
Columns 4 and 7 report the results of the extended model for the full sample (1978-1996).
The t statistics are reported in the parenthesis below. 
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SALES MULTIPLIER ASSET MULTIPLIER
BO  BO Extended BO BO  BO Extended BO
1978-1996 1986-1991 1978-1996 1978-1996 1986-1991 1978-1996
Constant –0.29 –0.32 –0.77 –0.07 –0.09 –0.45
(39) (24) (36) (10.39) (7.76) (24)
D –0.13 –0.12 –0.11 –0.12 –0.13 –0.11
(26) (12) (20) (27) (14) (21)
Log of Total Assets 0.03 0.04 0.52 0.00 0.01 0.36
(22) (17) (43) (0.35) (3.67) (33)
CAPX/SALES 0.33 0.29 0.17 0.05 0.03 –0.05
(25) (12) (9.88) (5.02) (1.70) (3.77)
EBIT/SALES 1.05 0.95 0.86 0.82 0.73 0.76
(57) (31) (42) (56) (30) (45)
Log of Total Assets (1 lag) –0.16 –0.09
(11) (–7.17)
CAPX/SALES (1 lag) 0.05 0.01
(4.15) (1.20)
EBIT/SALES (1 lag) 0.00 0.00
(0.47) (1.40)
Log of Total Assets (2 lag) –0.19 –0.15
(22) (20)
CAPX/SALES (2 lag) 0.00 0.00
(0.86) (1.35)






Number of observations 54451 16429 45291 52126 15524 43194
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.12Table II
Distribution of Firms by Diversification Profiles
This table reports the breakdown of firms in our sample by different diversification
profiles. The sample consists of all firms reported in Compustat, from 1978 to 1996, subject
to the sample selection criteria described in the text. The entire data for the firm were used to
classify firms into the categories (rather than just the years, which would be included after the
sample selection criteria have been employed). 
Firm Years Number of Firms
Firms which were always in single segments 30,284 5,387
Firms which diversify 4,326 606
Firms that diversified once from 1 segment to more 2,519 379
Firms that diversified once from multiple segments to more  791 105
Firms that diversified multiple times 1,016 122
Firms which refocus 7,987 873
Firms that refocused once from multiple to single 3,633 422
Firms that refocused once from multiple to multiple 1,588 183
Firm that refocused multiple times 2,766 268
Firms that both focused and diversified 13,133 1,371
Multi-segment firms which did not change 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Distribution of Excess Value over Time
This table displays summary statistics for the estimated excess value using sales and
asset multipliers over time. The table includes all firms’ years, single-segment as well as
multiple-segment.
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Sales multipliers Asset multipliers
Median Mean Std. Dev. Number Median Mean Std. Dev.  Number
1978 -0.026 -0.044 0.493 2438 -0.017 -0.025 0.396 2281
1979 -0.040 -0.056 0.507 2393 -0.033 -0.053 0.430 2278
1980 -0.032 -0.057 0.542 2393 -0.028 -0.039 0.461 2257
1981 -0.057 -0.084 0.544 2527 -0.048 -0.078 0.456 2347
1982 -0.058 -0.074 0.549 2470 -0.040 -0.055 0.465 2327
1983 -0.052 -0.071 0.541 2643 -0.030 -0.045 0.453 2454
1984 -0.028 -0.045 0.538 2703 -0.022 -0.031 0.440 2536
1985 -0.030 -0.045 0.536 2690 -0.024 -0.025 0.446 2484
1986 -0.028 -0.041 0.539 2781 -0.031 -0.025 0.441 2578
1987 0.000 -0.013 0.553 2885 -0.017 -0.018 0.456 2729
1988 0.000 -0.022 0.543 2808 -0.005 -0.010 0.443 2693
1989 0.000 -0.009 0.553 2712 -0.002 -0.001 0.472 2632
1990 0.000 -0.028 0.578 2708 -0.006 -0.012 0.491 2626
1991 0.000 -0.033 0.576 2771 -0.011 -0.025 0.520 2697
1992 -0.017 -0.042 0.578 3049 -0.023 -0.026 0.524 2994
1993 -0.019 -0.039 0.572 3403 -0.024 -0.029 0.514 3332
1994 -0.020 -0.036 0.567 3682 -0.015 -0.029 0.495 3632
1995 -0.009 -0.027 0.583 3896 -0.011 -0.010 0.516 3895
1996 -0.005 -0.029 0.597 4182 -0.005 -0.013 0.522 4252Table IV (B)
Effect of Changes in Industry Composition on Excess Value
The table reports results of excess value measured using sales multipliers. Columns
2 and 3 show average excess values for single-segment firm years. Column 4 documents the
median excess values for the last years of firms in the data while column 5 shows the number
of such firms. Column 6 shows the median excess value for the first year of firms in the data
while column 7 shows the number of such firms. 
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Median (for last Number of firms Median (for first Number of firms 
Year Median  Mean  year in sample) with last year year in sample) with first year
1978 0.0 0.0 0.019 78
1979 0.0 -0.008 -0.026 73 0 106
1980 0.0 -0.005 0 66 0.098 107
1981 0.0 -0.015 -0.061 84 0 203
1982 0.0 -0.012 -0.063 81 0.112 116
1983 0.0 -0.000 -0.165 134 0.135 234
1984 0.0 0.011 -0.037 128 0.089 227
1985 0.0 0.011 -0.024 147 0.134 201
1986 0.0 -0.004 -0.041 152 0.105 274
1987 0.0 0.006 -0.14 211 0.072 269
1988 0.0 -0.006 -0.126 179 0.139 206
1989 0.0 0.011 -0.011 117 0.129 175
1990 0.0 -0.009 -0.197 119 0.078 158
1991 0.0 -0.011 -0.286 90 0.207 225
1992 0.0 -0.019 -0.15 117 0.259 280
1993 0.0 -0.009 -0.112 175 0.159 394
1994 0.0 -0.009 -0.063 253 0.109 397
1995 0.0 -0.013 -0.125 271 0.144 433































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effect of Multiple-Segment Operations on Firm Value of Diversifying Firms
The sample consists of single-segment firms and all diversifying firms. The
dependent variable is excess value, which is the ratio of firm value to its imputed value. D is a
dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the firm operates in multi-segments and 0
otherwise, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to sales and CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital
expenditures to sales. SNP is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the firm is part
of the S&P Index and zero otherwise, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets and
ASS2 is the square of the log of total assets. Columns 2 to 6 (Columns 7 to 11) report results
when sales (asset) multipliers are used to calculate imputed value. Year dummies were
included in the 2SLS model as well as the Self-Selection Model. The Fixed Effects Model has
two-way fixed effects. The standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and the
corresponding T-statistics are given in parentheses below.
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Sales Multipliers Asset Multipliers
OLS OLS Fixed 2SLS Self- OLS OLS Fixed 2SLS Self-
 (BO) Effects Selection (BO)  Effects Selection
Constant –0.36 –0.75 –0.09 –0.72 –0.68 –0.14 –0.43 0.68 –0.34 –0.32
(33) (26) (1.67) (30) (30) (14) (17) (14) (15) (15)
D –0.13 –0.11 –0.06 0.30 0.18 -0.11 –0.09 –0.04 0.19 0.01
(10) (9.13) (2.88) (5.03) (4.03) (9.09) (7.94) (2.08) (3.29) (0.24)
Log of Total Assets 0.04 0.61 0.33 0.55 0.54 0.01 0.42 0.00 0.24 0.24
(19) (36) (16) (40) (39) (4.75) (28) (0.24) (19) (18)
EBIT/SALES 1.15 0.69 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.98 0.77 0.71 0.63 0.62
(42) (19) (13) (13) (13) (44) (26) (27) (16) (15)
CAPX/SALES 0.33 0.06 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.04 –0.06 –0.03 –0.02 –0.02
(15) (1.96) (7.25) (5.65) (5.68) (2.22) (2.38) (1.44) (0.98) (0.90)
Log of TA (1 lag) –0.25 –0.28 –0.25 –0.25 –0.15 –0.12 –0.04 –0.04
(12) (19) (13) (13) (8.10) (8.75) (2.32) (2.50)
EBIT/SALES (1 lag) 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.10
(5.57) (5.99) (5.49) (5.42) (2.18) (6.11) (2.31) (2.28)
CAPX/SALES (1 lag) 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.09 –0.05 –0.04 –0.01 –0.02
(2.45) (2.04) (3.51) (3.40) (1.91) (1.89) (0.67) (0.86)
Log of TA (2 lag) –0.20 –0.14 –0.14 –0.14 –0.17 –0.11 –0.12 –0.12
(16) (14) (13) (13) (16) (13) (12) (12)
EBIT/SALES (2 lag) 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 –0.02 0.05 –0.003 –0.002
(3.58) (4.84) (3.14) (3.19) (1.06) (3.02) (0.11) (0.09)
CAPX/SALES (2 lag) 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04
(3.65) (3.08) (3.94) (3.80) (2.78) (1.08) (2.79) (2.65)
SNP 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.28
(27) (28) (33) (33)
LEV –0.03 0.22 0.09 0.11 –0.06 0.12 0.03 0.04
(1.48) (10) (6.81) (8.11) (3.94) (5.72) (2.21) (3.61)
ASS2 –0.01 0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 0.01 –0.01 –0.01
(11) (6.12) (19) (19) (10) (6.38) (16) (16)
Lambda –0.14 –0.04
(6.07) (1.83)
Hausman Test  43 20
(P-Value) (0.0) (0.0)
T statistics: First Stage 22.0 21.0
Partial R2: First Stage 0.018 0.018
No. of Observations 24964 24964 24964 24964 24964 25480 25480 25480 25480 25480
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.20 0.65 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.59 0.08 0.08
F statistic 932 518 13.05 138 135 607 350 10.20 73 72Table VI
Probit Estimates for Diversifying Firms
The dependent variable takes the value 1 when the firm operates in multiple
segments and zero otherwise. The results reported are for a sample of single-segment firms
and all diversifying firms included in the excess value regressions using sales multipliers.
Columns 2 to 4 display the estimated coefficients, t-statistics, and marginal effects estimated
at the mean values of the exogenous variables. The probit model was also estimated for the
sample of firms included when asset multipliers were used to calculate excess values. These
estimates were qualitatively similar and have not been reported in the paper. Though they
have not been reported, the estimates were used to calculate the fitted probabilities and
selectivity correction for the corresponding estimation of the 2SLS model and the self-
selection model using asset multipliers. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to sales and
CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. PNDIV is the fraction of all firms
in the industry which are conglomerates and PSDIV is the fraction of sales by other firms in
the industry accounted for by conglomerates. MNUM is the number of announced
mergers/acquisitions in the year, while MVOL is the US $ value of these. GDP (GDP1) is the
growth rate in real GDP (and its lagged value) while CONTRACTION (CONTRACTION1)
is the number of months in the year the economy was in recession (and its lagged value).
MAJOREX is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm is listed in NASDAQ,
NYSE or AMEX and zero otherwise. FOREIGN is a dummy variable which takes the value 1
if the firm is incorporated outside the US and zero otherwise. SNP is a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if the firm is part of the S&P Index and zero otherwise.
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Coefficient T-statistic Marginal  Effect
Constant -3.47 -31.03 -0.21
Log of Total Assets 0.22 3.98 0.03
EBIT/SALES -0.07 -0.50 -0.01
CAPX/SALES 0.03 0.29 0.00
Log of TA (1 lag) -0.10 -1.19 -0.01
EBIT/SALES (1 lag) -0.07 -0.48 -0.01
CAPX/SALES (1 lag) -0.11 -0.80 -0.02
Log of TA (2 lag) 0.23 4.18 0.02
EBIT/SALES (2 lag) -0.10 -1.02 -0.01
CAPX/SALES (2 lag) -0.09 -0.87 -0.02
SNP -0.19 -4.08 -0.03
PNDIV 0.02 15.85 0.003
PSDIV 0.001 1.45 0.0002
MVOL -0.0001 -0.36 0.00
MNUM 0.11 3.69 0.01
GDP -0.01 -1.26 -0.002
GDP1 0.004 0.36 0.001
Contraction -0.08 -0.80 -0.02
Contraction 1 -0.02 -0.24 -0.01
A_TA -0.20 -6.15 -0.02
A_EBIT 0.10 1.35 0.01
A_CAPX 0.04 0.39 0.01
MAJOREX 0.16 6.02 0.02
FOREIGN 0.06 1.22 0.02





Effect of Multiple-Segment Operations on Firm Value of Diversifying Firms
The sample consists of single-segment firms and all diversifying firms. We report
partial results of alternate specifications of the model. All explanatory variables included in
table V were included but are not reported here as the results were qualitatively similar to
those in table V. Panel A includes RND/Sales, replacing missing values of R&D with zero.
Panel B also includes RND/Sales but excludes all missing values of R&D. Panel C includes
INDGROW (the growth in industry sales and its lagged value). Panel D reports results
excluding all lagged values of firm size, EBIT/Sales and CAPX/Sales. Year dummies have
been included in the estimation of the 2SLS as well as the estimation of the Self-Selection
model. Standard errors have been corrected for auto-correlation and corresponding T-statistics
are reported in parentheses below.
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Sales Multipliers Asset Multipliers
OLS OLS Fixed 2SLS Self- OLS OLS Fixed 2SLS Self-
(BO) Effects Selection (BO) Effects Selection
A: Years with Missing R&D have been assigned a value of zero
D -0.13 -0.10 -0.06 0.33 0.17 -0.11 -0.09 -0.04 0.40 0.12
(-10.6) (-8.53) (-2.87) (5.43) (3.66) (-9.1) (-7.51) (-2.04) (6.79) (2.76)
RND/SALES  0.75 0.42 0.78 0.77 0.38 0.32 0.40 0.38
 (15.56) (5.52) (15.48) (15.40) (9.91) (5.02) (10.34) (9.78)
Lambda -0.13 -0.10
(-5.52) (-4.16)
Hausman Test 46.92 63.00
(P-value) (0.00) (0.00)
T stats: First stage 22 22
Partial R2: First stage 0.019  0.019
No. of observations 24964 24964 24964 24964 24964 25480 25480 25480 25480 25480
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.21 0.65 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.59 0.08 0.08
F statistic 932 502 13 143 139 607 332 10 74 72
D -0.14 -0.08 -0.09 0.40 0.21 -0.16 -0.13 -0.05 0.07 -0.17
(-7.37) (-4.55) (-2.91) (6.37) (3.84) (-8.3) (-6.45) (-1.43) (0.97) (-2.82)
RND/SALES 0.73 0.58 0.78 0.77 0.47 0.53 0.48 0.46
(13) (7.04) (13) (13) (10) (7.42) (10) (10)
Lambda -0.15 0.03
(-5.00) (1.06)
Hausman Test 56.00 5.01
(P-value) (0.00) (0.03)
T stats: First stage 23.00 22.00
Partial R2: First stage .036 0.035
 
No. of observations 13055 13055 13055 13055 13055 13286 13286 13286 13286 13286
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.24 0.65 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.60 0.11 0.12
F statistic 670 319 12.5 89 86 467 228 10.2 55 55
B: Years with Missing R&D have been excludedTable VII (continued)
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D  -0.13 -0.11  -0.05  0.33  0.22 -0.11 -0.09 -0.05  0.21  0.05
  (-10) (-8.88) (-2.64)  (5.29)  (4.65)  (-10) (-8.00) (-2.35)  (3.39)  (1.01)
INDGROW x 10-2    -0.20 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10    -0.20  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10
    (-7.12) (-4.78) (-4.04) (-4.14)    (-7.64)  (-3.79)  (-4.94)  (-5.03)
INDGROW1 x 10-2    -0.10 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04    -0.10  -0.04  -0.10  -0.10
    (-4.13) (-3.09) (-1.90) (-2.02)    (-4.04)  (-2.12)  (-2.88)  (-3.01)
Lambda         -0.16       -0.06
         (-6.58)       (-2.56)
Hausman  Test       44        20 
(P-value)       (0.00)        (0.00) 
T stats: First stage        21          20 
Partial R2:  First  stage       0.017        0.017 
               
No.  of  observations  23110 23110  23110  23110  23110  23568 23568 23568 23568 23568
Adjusted R2  0.14 0.21  0.66  0.15  0.15  0.09 0.15 0.60 0.08 0.09
F statistic  933 443 13.4  126 124 614  303  10.6 69 67
               
 
    
D  -0.14 -0.12  -0.03  0.61  0.40 -0.11 -0.10 -0.02  0.67  0.29
  (-11.9) (-10.2)  (-1.48)  (9.92)  (9.38)  (-10.8) (-8.64) (-1.16) (10.58)  (6.89)
Lambda         -0.26       -0.19
         (-11)       (-8.48)
               
Hausman  Test       136        158 
(P-value)       (0.00)        (0.00) 
T stats: First stage        22          22 
Partial R2:  First  stage       0.017        0.017 
               
No.  of  observations  27812 27812  27812  27812  27812  28491 28491 28491 28491 28491
Adjusted R2  0.12 0.13  0.61  0.08  0.08  0.08 0.09 0.56 0.06 0.06
F statistic  983 704 11.0 101.3  99.5  654 477  9.3 69.4 67.5













C: Including Industry Growth Rates
D: Excluding all Lagged values of Firm size, EBIT/SALES and CAPX/SALESTable VIII
Effect of Multiple-Segment Operations on Firm Value of Refocusing Firms
The sample consists of single-segment firms and all refocusing firms. The dependent
variable is excess value, which is the ratio of firm value to its imputed value. D is a dummy
variable which takes the value 1 when the firm operates in multi-segments and 0 otherwise,
EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to sales and CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures
to sales. SNP is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the firm is part of the S&P
Index and zero otherwise, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets and ASS2 is the
square of the log of total assets. Columns 2 to 5 (Columns 6 to 9) report results when sales (asset)
multipliers are used to calculate imputed value. Year dummies have been included for the
estimation of the 2SLS as well as of the self-selection model. Standard errors have been
corrected for autocorrelation and T-statistics are reported in parentheses below.
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Constant  -0.38  -0.76 -0.14 -0.68 -0.68 -0.17  -0.43 0.62  -0.31  -0.31
  (36) (28)  (2.82)  (32)  (32)  (18) (17) (13) (15) (15)
D  -0.17 -0.13  -0.14  -0.21  -0.21  -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10
  (17) (14)  (9.20)  (9.60)  (10)  (14) (12)  (7.05)  (4.51)  (4.48)
Log of Total Assets  0.05  0.59  0.35  0.53  0.53  0.01  0.39  0.01  0.22  0.22
  (22)  (36) (17) (41) (41)  (7.23)  (28)  (0.69)  (18)  (18)
EBIT/SALES  1.14 0.66  0.37  0.40  0.40  1.00 0.76 0.67 0.59 0.59
  (43)  (19) (13) (12) (12) (46)  (27)  (28.)  (15)  (16)
CAPX/SALES  0.32  0.10 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.04  -0.03  -0.03  -0.004  -0.004
  (15) (3.43)  (7.46)  (6.64)  (6.64)  (2.44) (1.30) (1.24) (0.21) (0.20)
Log of TA (1 lag)    -0.24  -0.27  -0.24  -0.24    -0.14  -0.12  -0.04  -0.04
    (12) (19) (14) (14)    (8.09)  (9.43)  (2.79)  (2.78)
EBIT/SALES (1 lag)    0.26  0.21  0.23  0.23    0.13  0.20  0.16  0.16
    (7.15) (7.60) (6.25) (6.25)    (4.38)  (8.74)  (3.81)  (3.84)
CAPX/SALES (1 lag)    0.03  0.04  0.05  0.05    -0.07  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03
    (0.83) (1.91) (2.03) (2.04)    (2.79)  (2.19)  (1.59)  (1.60)
Log of TA (2 lag)    -0.18  -0.12  -0.11  -0.12    -0.15  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10
    (15) (13) (11) (11)    (15)  (12)  (11)  (11)
EBIT/SALES (2 lag)    0.12  0.12  0.09  0.10    -0.02  0.05  -0.01  -0.01
    (4.60) (5.86) (3.48) (3.56)    (1.10)  (2.76)  (0.28)  (0.24)
CAPX/SALES (2 lag)    0.09  0.06  0.06  0.06    0.06  0.02  0.04  0.04
    (3.72) (3.16) (3.23) (3.22)    (2.93)  (1.49)  (2.46)  (2.46)
SNP       0.25  0.25     0.28  0.29
       (29)  (29)      (35)  (35)
LEV   0.02 0.25 0.17 0.17    -0.04  0.15  0.09  0.08
    (1.43) (12) (13) (12)    (2.58)  (7.59)  (7.23)  (7.05)
ASS2   -0.01 0.01  -0.01  -0.01    -0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.01
   (12)  (3.48)  (21)  (21)    -9.85)  (5.76)  (15)  (15)
Lambda         0.03      -0.01
         (2.44)       (0.48)
Hausman  Test         3.20        0.08 
(P-Value)       (0.07)        (0.45) 
T statistics: First Stage        52          47 
Partial R2:  First  Stage       0.079        0.066 
               
No.  of  Observations  27995 27995  27995  27995  27995  28161 28161 28161 28161 28161
Adjusted R2  0.13 0.19  0.64  0.13  0.14  0.09 0.14 0.58 0.08 0.08
F statistic  1064  557  13.00  142 142 732  383  10.30 77 77













Probit Estimates for Refocusing Firms 
The dependent variable takes the value 1 when the firm operates in multiple segments
and zero otherwise. The results reported are for a sample of single-segment firms and all
focusing firms included in the excess value regressions using sales multipliers. Columns 2 to 4
display the estimated coefficients, t-statistics, and marginal effects estimated at the mean values
of the exogenous variables. The probit model was also estimated for the sample of firms included
when asset multipliers were used to calculate excess values. These estimates were qualitatively
similar and have not been reported in the paper. Though they have not been reported, the
estimates were used to calculate the fitted probabilities and selectivity correction for the
corresponding estimation of the 2SLS model and the self-selection model using asset multipliers.
EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to sales and CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures
to sales. PNDIV is the fraction of all firms in the industry which are conglomerates and PSDIV is
the fraction of sales by other firms in the industry accounted for by conglomerates. MNUM is the
number of announced mergers/acquisitions in the year, while MVOL is the US $ value of these.
GDP (GDP1) is the growth rate in real GDP (and its lagged value) while CONTRACTION
(CONTRACTION1) is the number of months in the year the economy was in recession (and its
lagged value). MAJOREX is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm is listed in
NASDAQ, NYSE or AMEX and zero otherwise. FOREIGN is a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 if the firm is incorporated outside the US and zero otherwise. SNP is a dummy
variable which takes the value 1 if the firm is part of the S&P Index and zero otherwise.
34
  Coefficient T-statistics Marginal  Effect
    
Constant -3.40  -35.21  -0.24
Log of Total Assets  -0.09  -1.53  0.00
EBIT/SALES -0.28  -1.94  -0.07
CAPX/SALES 0.24  1.58  -0.02
LOG OF TA (1 lag)  -0.20  -2.29  -0.02
EBIT/SALES (1 lag)  0.05  0.29  -0.03
CAPX/SALES (1 lag)  0.85  4.77  0.01
Log of TA (2 lag)  0.11  1.88  -0.01
EBIT/SALES (2 lag)  -0.14  -1.07  -0.01
CAPX/SALES (2 lag)  0.88  5.20  -0.02
SNP  -0.06 -1.54  0.01
PNDIV 0.02  14.97  0.003
PSDIV 0.01  12.87  0.001
MVOL  0.0003 1.02  0.0002
MNUM -0.21  -8.10  -0.04
GDP  0.04 4.62  0.01
GDP1 0.01  0.93  -0.001
Contraction 0.32  3.90  0.10
Contraction 1  0.25  3.15  0.05
A_TA 0.43  11.56  0.07
A_EBIT -0.52  -4.40  -0.07
A_CAPX -3.68  -13.97  -0.11
MAJOREX 0.20  7.94  0.03
FOREIGN -0.33  -5.64  -0.05
    
No. of observations      27995
Maximized likelihood      -8381
Likelihood index      0.21
% of positive observations      12.60Table X
Effect of Multiple-Segment Operations on Firm Value of Refocusing Firms 
The sample consists of single-segment firms and all focusing firms. We report partial
results of alternate specifications of the model. All explanatory variables included in table V
were included but are not reported here as the results were qualitatively similar to those in
table V. Panel A includes RND/Sales, replacing missing values of R&D with zero. Panel B
also includes RND/Sales but excludes all missing values of R&D. Panel C includes
INDGROW (the growth in industry sales and its lagged value). Panel D reports results
excluding all lagged values of firm size, EBIT/Sales and CAPX/Sales. Year dummies have
been included in the estimation of the 2SLS as well as the estimation of the Self-Selection
model. Standard errors have been corrected for auto-correlation and corresponding T-statistics
are reported in parentheses below.
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D     -0.17 -0.12 -0.14 -0.19 -0.20 -0.13 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10
  (17)  (13) (9.17) (8.83) (9.69)  (14.44)  (11)  (7.01)  (4.43)  (4.52)
RND/SALES    0.75 0.39 0.70 0.69    0.41  0.31  0.35  0.35
   (15)  (5.12)  (14)  (14)   (10)  (4.93)  (9.42)  (9.42)
Lambda         0.03      0.00
         (2.23)       (0.27)
               
Hausman  Test       9.30        0.18 
(P-Value)       (0.0)        (.35) 
T stats: First stage        51.0          47.0 
Partial R2:  First  stage         0.073        0.073 
               
No.  of  Observations  27995 27995  27995  27995  27995  28161 28161 28161 28161 28161
Adjusted R2  0.13 0.20  0.64  0.14  0.14  0.09 0.14 0.58 0.08 0.08
F statistic  1064  537  13.1  145 146 732  363  10.2 76 76
               
 
               
D  -0.21 -0.15  -0.16  -0.20  -0.22  -0.16 -0.12 -0.12 -0.15 -0.15
  (17)  (11)  (7)  (8.15)  (9.29)  (14) (8.89) (5.14) (5.83) (6.32)
RND/SALES    0.79 0.85 0.90 0.89    0.54  0.79  -0.03  -0.04
   (13)  (8.34)    (17)   (11)  (9.36)  (1.74)  (1.91)
Lambda       17.68  0.03    -0.35      0.02
         (2.36)    (10)      (1.65)
               
Hausman  Test       5.15        2.79 
(P-Value)       (0.03)        (0.10) 
T stats: First Stage        49.0          47.0 
Partial R2:  First  Stage         0.113        0.107 
               
No.  of  Observations  15162 15162  15162  15162  15162  15174 15174 15174 15174 15174
Adjusted R2  0.18 0.24  0.65  0.17  0.18  0.14 0.18 0.60 0.11 0.12
F statistic  842 370 13.1  100 104 598  260  10.5 64 63
A: Years with missing R&D have been assigned a value zero
B: Years with missing R&D have been excludedTable X (continued)
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D  -0.16 -0.13  -0.14  -0.22  -0.22  -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09
  (18) (14)  (8.96)  (9.65)  (10)  (15) (11)  (6.78)  (4.60)  (4.23)
INDGROW  1    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
    (7.68) (4.92) (5.04) (5.15)    (7.71)  (4.95)  (5.97)  (6.01)
INDGROW  2    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
    (3.76) (2.65) (3.09) (3.20)    (3.38)  (2.15)  (3.29)  (3.33)
Lambda         0.03      -0.01
         (2.74)       (0.52)
               
Hausman  Test       14.21        0.26 
(P-Value)       (0.00)        (0.35) 
T stats: First Stage        49.0          45.0 
Partial R2:  First  Stage         0.076        0.067 
               
No.  of  Observations  25968 25968  25968  25968  25968  26097 26097 26097 26097 26097
Adjusted R2  0.14 0.20  0.65  0.14  0.14  0.10 0.15 0.59 0.08 0.08
F statistic  1058  478  13.4  131 131 732  328  10.5 72 71
               
               
D  -0.18 -0.17  -0.15  -0.77  -0.66  -0.14 -0.14 -0.11 -0.37 -0.33
  (20) (18)  (9.95)  (35)  (32)  (17) (15)  (7.46) (16) (15)
Lambda         0.27      0.11
         (23)       (9.50)
               
Hausman  Test       800        130 
(P-Value)       (0.0)        (0.0) 
T stats: First Stage        55.0          51.0 
Partial R2:  First  Stage       0.08        0.069 
               
No.  of  Observations  30818 30818  30818  30818  30818  31129 31129 31129 31129 31129
Adjusted R2  0.13 0.13  0.60  0.07  0.08  0.09 0.10 0.56 0.05 0.06
F statistic  1117  794  11.2 111.2 111.1  771 551  9.3 72 75













C: Including Industry Growth Rates
D: Excluding all Lagged values of Firm size, EBIT/SALES and CAPX/SALES